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Abstract 
We analyze commercial banks’ profitability (return on equity, ROE) at different levels of 
creditor rights and an aggregate score of information sharing in terms of credit bureaus. 
After controlling for bank size and some macroeconomic variables, the results indicate 
that profitability is higher and more persistent when creditors are well protected. Further-
more, the presence of a (public or private) credit bureau increases the persistence of ROE, 
but higher levels of information sharing foster competition and erode future profitability. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study the effects of creditor-rights protection and informa-
tion sharing on the level and persistence of commercial banks’ profitability around 
the world using firm-level data for more than 100 countries during the period 1996– 
–2003. To study the influence of the creditor legal environment, we employ the “cred-
itor-rights” index proposed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), which measures the legal 
rights of creditors against defaulting debtors in different jurisdictions. The informa-
tion-sharing score is constructed starting from Shleifer’s Database. 
Our empirical strategy is twofold. To run ROE firm-level regressions by year, 
first we explain ROE in terms of creditor rights and information sharing, controlling 
by size and macroeconomic variables, then we add current ROE as an independent 
variable to find out the effect of the variables mentioned on the ROE persistence, 
using the next-year ROE as dependent variable. 
The results can be summarized in brief. First, we find that the most profitable 
banks are from countries without credit bureaus and with the strongest creditor-rights 
protection. Second, lower levels of information sharing are associated with higher 
current and future profitability, supporting the idea that credit bureaus make a more 
competitive market. Third, creditor-rights protection is positively associated with 
current ROE, and the highest persistence of ROE corresponds to banks located in 
countries with the strongest protection. And finally, ROE persistence increases in 
economies without credit bureaus when they establish one, but declines when another 
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credit bureau appears in the country, suggesting that competitive pressure is very 
strong in the banking industry. That is, information sharing among banks stimulates 
more competition by lowering their informational rents. 
Our work is related to previous studies of legal origin, information sharing in 
credit markets, and profit persistence. The evidence in this paper differs from those in 
three significant respects. First, rather than considering country-aggregate tests of 
credit markets, we build upon firm-specific measures of profitability. Second, in ad-
dition to studying the  effects of contemporaneous variables, we develop a  test of 
next-period bank performance. Third, while previous studies have checked how credi-
tor rights and information sharing affect aggregate credit or the availability and cost 
of firm credit, we investigate the implications of that interaction between information 
sharing and creditor-rights protection on commercial banks’ profitability. Our find-
ings provide a new piece of economic reasoning in the puzzle of banks’ performance 
conditioned by creditor rights and information sharing. 
The next section of the paper presents the main related evidence found in 
the literature about the legal environment, creditor rights, and profitability. Section 3 
presents the data used in the study and the basic results about the effects of the vari-
ables on profitability. Section 4 examines profitability across banks and countries. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Differences in legal protection of investors and creditors are important to ex-
plain why firms are financed and owned differently in different countries. La Porta et 
al. (1998) find that richer countries and common law countries have the biggest 
capital markets and the strongest legal protection. 
Creditor rights are more complex than shareholder rights because there may 
be different types of creditors with different interests, and protecting the rights of 
some creditors reduces the rights of others. On the other hand, there are two general 
creditor strategies of dealing with a defaulting firm: liquidation and reorganization, 
which require different effective rights. Consequently, La Porta et al. (1998) score 
creditor rights in both cases and add up the scores to create a creditor-rights index, 
using five creditor-rights variables. 
Some researchers have emphasized that culture proxies, such as religion, are 
also helpful in understanding how creditor rights are enforced across countries (Stulz 
and Williamson, 2003), but Djankov et al. (2007) show that religious variables are no 
longer significant when the legal origin is added. Their results also show that the ex-
istence of public registries that permit information sharing between lenders improves 
the system and mitigates lesser legal protection. 
Previous research has shown four important effects of information sharing. 
First, the existence of credit bureaus improves the banks’ knowledge of applicants’ 
characteristics and allows better estimations of repayment probabilities, which, at 
least partially, solves the adverse selection problem, reducing default rates (Pagano 
and Jappelli, 1993; Brown et al., 2009). Though an interest rate decrease is a com-
monly accepted effect, Karapetyan and Stacescu (2009) show that it depends on 
the type of signal resulting from monitoring: good (bad) signal borrowers will get 
lower (higher) interest rates. Second, credit bureaus may reduce the banks’ appro-338                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4 
priation of informational rents. The informational advantage confers to banks some 
market power over their customers, so several banks may be very profitable in a con-
text of no information sharing (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Padilla and Pagano, 1997; 
Niemeyer, 2003). Third, credit bureaus act as a mechanism that disciplines borrowers 
in order to maintain a good reputation with the generality of lenders, and it is also 
a way to avoid excessive lending when each borrower may patronize several banks. 
These effects reduce the moral hazard problem (Vercammen, 1995; Padilla and Pa-
gano, 1997, 2000; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2000; Bennardo et al., 2007; Brown and Zehn-
der, 2007). And finally, the degree of privacy protection has historically affected 
the development of credit bureaus. On the other hand, public intervention is more 
likely where creditor rights are poorly protected (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000, 2002; 
Brown and Zehnder, 2007). 
As for the influence of the legal environment and information sharing on 
banks’ performance we have found scarce but revealing evidence. A couple of recent 
works empirically test the  significant and interactive effects of both institutional 
features. Brown et al. (2009) find that in countries with worse protection or creditor 
rights, information sharing improves both credit access (more abundant credit) and 
loan contract terms (cheaper credit), especially for more opaque firms. Consistent 
with the previously mentioned results of Djankov et al. (2007), Houston et al. (2010) 
find that bank risk taking is less sensitive to creditor rights in the presence of good 
information sharing. 
Consequently, three positive effects on profitability could be expected from 
information sharing and an additional one from better creditor rights protection: 
–  an increase in the number of loans with good signal borrowers, as more accurate 
predictions of individual loan defaults can be made by banks; 
–  a decrease in the number of loans with bad signal borrowers, for which banks’ 
private information was poor; 
–  a decrease in the number of loans with multi-bank borrowers when the global 
credit risk of the borrower is outside the acceptable limits for banks; 
–  higher recovery rates in the event of default, as with stronger creditor rights 
lenders are more likely to grab collateral, force repayment, or even gain control 
of a debtor that is in financial distress (Houston et al., 2010). 
But these effects have to be considered within real country-specific scenar- 
ios in which market powers introduce subtle variations in the  resultant influence   
of the factors concerned. Thus, in bank services, profitability persistence may reflect 
the existence of impediments to competition and informational opacity, as Mathisen 
and Buchs (2005) explore for a non-competitive market structure in the Ghanaian 
banking system.
1 Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that concentration of credit markets 
makes creditors more likely to finance credit-constrained firms because it is easier 
for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. Without barriers 
to entry and asymmetric information, relatively high performance by a bank would 
be eliminated reasonably quickly as other financial firms enter the market. For ex-
ample, Lensink and Murinde (2006) show that, after some point, foreign bank entry 
1 This structure, along with other market characteristics, constitutes an indirect barrier to entry, thereby shield-
ing the large profits in the Ghanaian banking system. Mathisen and Buchs (2005) suggest that the non-
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starts to stimulate aggregate investment as a  consequence of increasing competi-
tiveness. Consistent with the findings of Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), more regu-
lations can be expected in civil law countries, where the incremental fixed costs of 
introducing and administering new regulations are lower.
2 In addition, persistence 
may reflect some sensitivity to regional or macroeconomic shocks (Mathisen and 
Buchs, 2005). 
Considering the empirical evidence gathered so far, we could expect more cred-
it business for banks in countries with information sharing and with strong creditor- 
-rights protection.
3 However, as countries establish private and public mechanisms to 
share information more efficiently, informational asymmetries tend to disappear and 
lenders can do their business more safely, adding competitive pressures to the lend-
ing market. Hence, as the country develops, private and public information sharing 
mechanisms may foster competition, causing a reduction of banks’ profitability per-
sistence. Improvements in creditor rights and judicial efficiency increase aggregate 
lending, owing to a reduction of credit risk (repayment rates are higher). However, 
the impact of judicial efficiency on the average interest rate is ambiguous. Interest 
rates can either increase or decrease depending on the competitive structure of banks 
and some other factors (Jappelli et al., 2005). Finally, it is necessary to control for 
the effects of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ profitability. 
3. Data 
We gather data on 103 countries and 796 commercial banks from 1996 to 2003. 
We employ three firm-level variables from BankScope Database. Profitability is meas-
ured by the return on equity (earnings/book value of equity) of the current year (ROE) 
and of the following year (computed as FROEt = ROEt+1); to control for the bank’s 
size we employ the logarithm of total assets (logta). 
The creditor-rights index (cr) follows that constructed by La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) for 133 countries.
4 The creditor-rights index meas-
ures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: first, whether there are restric-
tions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; second, whether 
secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for reorganization 
is approved (in other words, whether there is no ‘automatic stay’ or ‘asset freeze’ im-
posed by the court); third, whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds 
of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and finally, whether a manager is responsible for run-
ning the  business during the  reorganization. A  value of one is added to the  index 
when a country’s laws and regulations provide each of these powers to secured 
lenders. The creditor-rights index aggregates the scores and varies between 0 (poor 
creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
The information-sharing score (agreginfo) measures the tendency to share in-
formation between lenders. We construct this score from 0 (no information sharing) 
 
2 Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) argue that the pervasive administrative state introduced in France by its revo-
lution lowered the fixed costs of incremental regulations. 
3 One potential problem is that banks can operate in various countries. However, loan portfolios tend to be 
home-biased (Méon and Weill, 2005) 
4 Data available on the following webpage: 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Country Year 
Obs. 
FROE  4340 0.109 0.117  -0.446 0.491  - 
ROE  5099 0.110 0.118  -0.446 0.491  - 
logta  5324  14.452 2.189 7.601  20.648  - 
interest  4479 0.138 0.119 0.018 1.468  653 
gdp  5156 0.032 0.025  -0.105 0.135  756 
inf  5156 0.043 0.095  -0.036 3.650  756 
loggdppc  5156  12.060 2.267 6.993  15.218  756 
agreginfo  5326 0.987 0.630 0  2  788 
cr  5019 2.029 1.029 0  4  649 
Notes: FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of in-
flation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing) 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest infor-
mation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights 
aggregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). The last 
column displays the number of country year observations for all those by country variables. 
 
to 2 (strongest information sharing), adding one (two) if the country has a public reg-
istry or a private bureau (both) in the current year. We obtain this information from 
Shleifer’s Database. 
The interest rate data (interest) are from the  IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (Yearbooks 2004 and 2005, line 60p) and measure the interest rate of 
the bank’s prime lending in the country (year average). 
To control for other country variables, we use the annual percentage change of 
gross domestic product in constant prices (GDP), the logarithm of gross domestic 
product per capita in constant prices (loggdppc), and the annual percentage change of 
inflation (inf). All of these variables are from IMF World Economic Outlook (Sep-
tember 2005 Edition). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the firm-year variables and the num-
ber of country-year observations for the variables concerned. To exclude spurious 
financial ratios, we have deleted commercial banks with an ROE in the top and bot-
tom two percent. This leaves us with 5,099 commercial bank-year observations in 
the sample. The sample period contains moments with high instability in the markets, 
such as the Russian crisis in the late 1990s. For this reason, the control variables are 
very disperse, showing important economic shocks that may affect banks’ earnings. 
Taken together, the summary statistics present highly volatile bank profitability, with 
moderate levels of creditor rights across the world, but with an important presence of 
credit bureaus. 
Table 2, Panel A, reports the number of banks and countries in each level of 
the creditor-rights score by year, showing stable behavior in protection across coun-
tries. Panel B displays the parallel numbers for information sharing, showing a gradual 
increase of credit bureaus internationally. But profitability is very different from one 
country to another, as Table 3 shows. This table lists the average ROE, the standard 
deviation, and the number of observations in each country. Also, it shows the mean 
values of the creditor index and the information-sharing score. The most profitable 
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Table 2  Number of Countries and Banks by Year 
Panel A: By Creditor Rights Score 









(4)  Total 
1996 Countries  6  21  18  22  8  75 
 Banks  31 99  149 135 44  458 
1997 Countries  7  20  21  23  8  79 
 Banks  33  109  164 152 47  505 
1998 Countries  7  21  20  23  8  79 
 Banks  35  113  184 220 46  598 
1999 Countries  7  21  24  22  8  82 
 Banks  39  122  211 232 44  648 
2000 Countries  7  22  26  20  8  83 
 Banks  47  216  223 158 45  689 
2001 Countries  7  22  29  19  8  85 
 Banks  50  224  249 152 45  720 
2002 Countries  7  21  29  19  8  84 
 Banks  51  220  262 150 44  727 
2003 Countries  7  20  28  19  8  82 
   Banks  47  132  315  144  36  674 
Total Bank-Country 
Observations       333     1,235     1,757     1,343       351     5,019 
 
Panel B: By Information Sharing Index 





(2)  Total 
1996 Countries  37  40  14  91 
 Banks  149  264  76  489 
1997 Countries  36  44  15  95 
 Banks  164  279  97  540 
1998 Countries  33  47  15  95 
 Banks  131  393  109  633 
1999 Countries  34  48  17  99 
 Banks  129  420  137  686 
2000 Countries  34  50  17  101 
 Banks  128  458  146  732 
2001 Countries  34  51  18  103 
 Banks  136  470  155  761 
2002 Countries  31  53  19  103 
 Banks  136  479  155  770 
2003 Countries  29  53  19  101 
   Banks  118  450  147  715 
Total Bank-Country 
Observations  1091 3,213  1,022  5,326 
 
case is Zambia with an ROE of 44.6%. This country has a strong level of creditor 
rights, but, in contrast, has no credit bureau, hence banks might be able to obtain 
strong monopolistic rents. 
On the other side, we have those that are evolving badly, located in Asia 
(Thailand and Japan). These are countries with medium levels of creditor rights and 
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Table 3  Mean Values of ROE, Creditor Rights Score, and Information Sharing Score 
by Country 
Coun- 




try  ROE sd.  Freq. cr 
Agreg- 
info 
AE 0.154  0.0364  39  2  1  LI 0.072  0.0809  2    0 
AR  0.073  0.1156  24 1 2  LK  0.138 0.0525  38 2 1 
AT 0.085  0.0217  30  3  2  LT 0.043  0.1546  23  1.96  1 
AU 0.134  0.0377  71  3  1 LU 0.162  0.0282  12   0 
BB 0.135  0.0398  8   0  LV 0.062  0.0502  5  3  0.13 
BD  0.167  0.1273  107 2 1  MA  0.102 0.0436  38 1 1 
BE 0.083  0.2532  3  2  2  MC 0.186  0.0398  8   0 
BH  0.118  0.0565  36   0  MD  0.206 0.0999  36 2 0 
BM 0.123  0.0629  15   0 MT 0.099  0.0692  32    0 
BO 0.077  0.1126  32  2  2 MU 0.162  0.0244  15    0 
BR 0.116  0.1435  78  1  1.89  MW 0.333  0.0660  14  2.50  0 
BW 0.349  0.0938  16 3 1  MX  0.056 0.3161  11 0 1 
CA  0.133  0.0355  72 1 1  MY  0.113 0.0496  31 3 2 
CH  0.086  0.0547  43 1 1  NA  0.261 0.0377  7 2 1 
CL 0.132  0.1073  44  2  2  NG 0.203  0.1232  119  4  0.70 
CN 0.159  0.1004  37  2  0.68  NI 0.268  0.0759  8  4  1 
CO  0.096  0.1215  61 0 1  NL  0.153 0.0280  8 3 1 
CR  0.126  0.0650  33 1 2  NO -0.006 0.1360  11 2 1 
CY  0.065  0.1140  24   0  NP  0.224 0.1352  65 2 1 
CZ 0.138  0.1135  6  3  0.50  OM 0.147  0.0877  28  0  0 
DE  0.058  0.1080  96 3 2  PA  0.144 0.0456  20 4 1 
DK  0.106  0.0467  292 3 1  PE  0.094 0.1012  53 0 2 
EC 0.084  0.1262  33  0  1 PH 0.073  0.0701  101  1  0.78 
EE 0.222  0.1308  8   0  PK 0.117 0.1111  105 1 1.64 
EG 0.135  0.1133  167  2  1 PL 0.077  0.1225  86  1  0.57 
ES  0.147  0.0349  111 2 2  PT  0.155 0.0408  27 1 2 
FI 0.140  0.0799  20  1  1  PY 0.086  0.1456  8  1  2 
FR 0.120  0.0837  70  0  1  QA 0.163  0.0542  31   0 
GB 0.108  0.1536  31  4  1 RO 0.148  0.0564  7  1.71  1 
GH 0.331  0.1114  18  1  1 RU 0.129  0.1783  20  1.40  0 
GR  0.120  0.0894  68 1 1  SA  0.172 0.0647  56 3 1 
HK 0.115  0.0775  56  4  1 SD 0.160  0.1158  31   0 
HN 0.129  0.0930  81  2  0.82  SE 0.165  0.0392  16  1  1 
HR 0.068  0.1060  123  3  0 SG 0.095  0.0234  16  3  0.25 
HU 0.183  0.1473  16  1  1 SI 0.052  0.1269  22  3  1 
ID 0.104  0.1276  129  2.19 1  SK 0.133  0.1667  18  2  0.88 
IE 0.175  0.0491  32  1  1  SR  0.197  0.1060  16    0 
IL  0.062  0.0419  69 3 1  SV  0.093 0.1026  40 3 2 
IN 0.177  0.0821  215  2  0  SZ 0.105  0.1389  8    0 
IR 0.109  0.0288  2  2  1  TH  -0.012 0.1883  43 2.23  0.77 
IS  0.125  0.0504  18   0  TN  0.114 0.0474  73 0 1 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4                                      343 
Coun- 




try  ROE sd.  Freq. cr 
Agreg- 
info 
IT  0.073  0.1003  143 2 2  TR  0.150 0.1597  41 2 2 
JM 0.178  0.1248  23  2  0  TT 0.223  0.0434  24   0 
JO  0.078  0.0799  69 1 1  TW  0.006 0.1274  138 2 2 
JP -0.008  0.0937  489  1.82 1 UA  0.083  0.0992  8  2  0 
KE  0.172  0.1748  51 4 1  US  0.104 0.0760  67 1 1 
KN  0.105  0.0547 8   0  UZ  0.035 0.0174  3 2 0 
KR  0.044  0.1273  50 3 1  VE  0.220 0.1443  68 3 1 
KW 0.140  0.0657  48  3 0.25  ZA 0.157  0.1698  7  3  1 
KZ 0.154  0.1079  66  2.34 0  ZM 0.446  0.0384  2  1  0 
LB  0.169  0.0666  41 4 1  ZW  0.273 0.0930  7 4 0 
LC 0.115  0.0537  4   0  Total     0.110     0.118  5099 2.03  0.99 
Notes: The Table reports the country averages of ROE, cr a agreginfo. For a better interpretation of ROE, 
standard deviation and frequency are also provided. ROE is the Return on Equity; agreginfo is the In-
formation Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no infor-
mation sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest information 
sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights aggregate 
score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
Table 4  Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of ROE by Year and Creditor 
Rights Score (cr) 
year  Very Low (0)  Low (1)  Medium (2)  High (3)  Very High (4)  Total 
1996 0.124  0.134  0.151 0.113 0.196 0.138 
 0.120  0.096  0.111  0.077 0.108 0.101 
   30  93 137 130  41 431 
1997 0.116  0.127  0.148 0.095 0.182 0.129 
 0.102  0.095  0.126  0.106 0.138 0.116 
   33 105 157 145  46 486 
1998 0.088  0.107  0.126 0.066 0.165 0.102 
 0.115  0.100  0.122  0.127 0.109 0.122 
   35 108 171 197  44 555 
1999 0.092  0.115  0.135 0.074 0.137 0.106 
 0.128  0.111  0.112  0.107 0.159 0.118 
   38 114 191 226  42 611 
2000 0.076  0.068  0.119 0.103 0.189 0.101 
 0.141  0.109  0.129  0.111 0.123 0.123 
   47 208 213 156  43 667 
2001 0.099  0.047  0.111 0.094 0.175 0.091 
 0.094  0.122  0.139  0.105 0.132 0.129 
   50 213 239 145  44 691 
2002 0.122  0.049  0.101 0.105 0.152 0.090 
 0.080  0.124  0.140  0.091 0.119 0.125 
   51 212 253 142  40 698 
2003 0.136  0.121  0.110 0.137 0.156 0.122 
 0.082  0.110  0.106  0.101 0.101 0.105 
   46 130 311 140  33 660 
Total 0.106  0.085  0.121 0.095 0.170 0.108 
 0.109  0.117  0.125  0.107 0.126 0.119 
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Table 5  ROE by Year and Information Sharing Score 
PANEL A: Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of ROE by Year and 
Information Sharing Score (agreginfo) 





Information (2)  Total 
1996  0.158 0.137 0.112 0.139 
  0.112 0.102 0.073 0.102 
 138 248  76 462 
1997  0.155 0.123 0.109 0.130 
  0.113 0.121 0.094 0.115 
 159 267  95 521 
1998  0.130 0.101 0.086 0.104 
  0.105 0.127 0.111 0.120 
 117 366 107 590 
1999  0.141 0.104 0.098 0.109 
  0.123 0.122 0.087 0.116 
 120 392 136 648 
2000  0.141 0.100 0.084 0.104 
  0.110 0.124 0.113 0.121 
 119 445 144 708 
2001  0.137 0.089 0.065 0.093 
  0.094 0.130 0.130 0.127 
 131 455 145 731 
2002  0.147 0.082 0.073 0.092 
  0.103 0.121 0.137 0.124 
 130 466 143 739 
2003  0.165 0.114 0.118 0.123 
  0.082 0.099 0.123 0.103 
 113 441 146 700 
Total 0.147  0.103 0.091 0.110 
  0.106 0.120 0.114 0.118 
 1027 3080  992 5099 
 
the existence of credit bureaus. It is probable that more competition exists here than 
in other countries without information sharing. Another possible explanation points 
to macroeconomic shocks (in the  sample period Asia was affected by macroeco-
nomic shocks that could have eroded banks’ earnings). 
As Table 4 shows, the more creditor rights exist, the more profitable banks 
get. In fact, banks in countries with strong creditor rights tend to show more stable 
(and positive) earnings, while banks’ profitability takes more extreme values in coun-
tries with little creditor protection. We have 330 banks in countries with the weakest 
creditor rights and an average ROE of 10.6%, compared with 333 banks in countries 
with the strongest creditor rights and an average ROE of 17.6%. These results are 
consistent year by year and reflect the fact that banking business is safer and more 
profitable in those countries where more creditor protection exists. 
In Table 5, Panel A, we present data classified by the level of information shar-
ing. As expected, the more information there is, the less profitability banks achieve. 
Year by year, banks in countries with no information sharing are more profitable, 
according to the existence of informational asymmetries as a source of monopolistic 
 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4                                      345 
PANEL B: One-way ANOVA 
Source  SS  df  MS  F  Prob > F 
Between groups  1.896  2  0.948  69.83  0 
Within groups  69.176  5096  0.014     
Total 71.072  5098  0.0139     
 
rents. The pool sample shows an average ROE of 14.7% for banks in countries with-
out credit bureaus, 10.3% if a private or public bureau exists, and 9.1% if both types 
exist.  
One-way ANOVA (Table 2, Panel B) is used to test for differences between 
the three groups of information-sharing scores. The significant F value of 69.83 tells 
us that the  mean values of ROE are not equal across information-sharing levels, 
though it does not tell us where the differences are. In the next section we explore 
the nature of the relation between ROE and information-sharing scores. 
4. Cross-Country Creditor Rights and Commercial Banks’ Profitability 
In this section, we present the cross-sectional results on the determinants of 
ROE in 103 countries. Our empirical test is based on a cross-section analysis of com-
mercial banks’ profitability and assesses the sensitivity of current ROE to creditor 
rights, to information sharing in the country, to bank size, and to a number of other 
country-specific variables. We run the following regression: 
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ROE ta cr α αα α α ε +
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=+ + + + + ∑             (1) 
The economic control variables are: 
–  economic growth: gross domestic product (annual change), 
–  economic wealth: log GDP per capita, 
–  primary source of earnings (interest rates): lending rates, 
–  financial instability: inflation (annual rate). 
We then measure profitability persistence and the effect of the same explana-
tory variables on profitability persistence by running the following regression:  
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ROE ROE ta cr α αα α α α ε ++
=
=+ + + + + + ∑    (2) 
Note that the dependent variable is represented by the following year’s return 
on equity at the individual bank level. In this expression, as α1 approaches unity, 
ROE gets more persistent.  
As a first assessment of whether return on equity is higher and more persistent 
in countries with better creditor rights, we look at the correlation between the vari-
ables. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 6. We find that the more creditor- 
-rights protection there is, the greater is current and future profitability. Higher levels 
of current and future profitability are associated with lower levels of information 
shared, supporting the idea that credit bureaus add competition pressure to lenders. 
Furthermore, the  correlations show that macroeconomic instability, as proxied by 
inflation, is positively associated with current and future profitability, while gross 
domestic product per capita is negatively associated with ROE, indicating that richer 
 346                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4 
Table 6  Correlation Matrix: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients between the Variables 
   FROE ROE  logta  interest gdp  inf  loggdppc  agreginfo  cr 
FROE  1            
ROE  0.6100* 1          
logta  -0.1488* -0.1352* 1         
interest  0.1953* 0.2187* -0.3389* 1        
gdp  0.1109* 0.1350* -0.0562* 0.1278* 1       
inf  0.1215* 0.1220* -0.0365* 0.2722* -0.0389* 1      
loggdppc  -0.0881* -0.0936* 0.1426* -0.1825* -0.3257* -0.1027* 1    
agreginfo  -0.1554* -0.1493* 0.2271* 0.0251 0.0036 -0.1439* -0.1346* 1   
cr  0.0798* 0.0892* -0.0858* -0.0385* 0.0086 0.1116* -0.0669* -0.1130* 1 
Notes: * Significant at 5%. 
FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of 
inflation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest infor-
mation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights ag-
gregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
countries with stable economies have more competitive markets with fewer business 
opportunities for lenders. The  correlations between these national characteristics 
confirm that it is important to control for them in assessing the impact of current 
ROE on next-period ROE. 
After matching the available information for explanatory and dependent vari-
ables we end up with a sample size of 4,340 bank-years for the estimation of the ROE 
regressions. While some variables, such as gross domestic product, are available for 
all sampled banks, others, such as ROE, have a smaller coverage. As a result of lower 
data availability, the number of banks for which we were able to obtain data for 
the explanatory and dependent variables was limited to a total of 3,983 bank-years 
when current ROE is the dependent variable and 3,356 bank-years when next-year 
ROE is the dependent variable.  
Table 7 presents the regressions of current ROE on the creditor-rights index, 
information sharing, size, and economic control variables. The three columns show: 
(1) pooled OLS estimates, (2) bank fixed effects, and (3) bank and country fixed 
effects. For the  three types of regressions, the  results confirm a  negative relation 
between profitability and information sharing and a positive relation between profit-
ability and creditor-rights protection, in line with the basic results obtained in our 
previous section. Also, most of the independent variables (except size) are significant 
for explaining contemporaneous profitability. That is, interest rates, gross domestic 
product (GDP), GDP per capita, and inflation are very significant variables using 
pooled OLS analysis, and only GDP drops when we perform panel data analyses. 
Consequently, an  increase in lending rates, economic growth, and inflation foster 
improved bank profitability, which is consistent with more banking business being 
generated by economic growth and development in general, as well as by higher in-
termediation margins.  
As the most commonly accepted drivers of bank profitability are intermedia-
tion spread and loan losses, by substituting current ROE by loan loss provision, and  
 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4                                      347 















 (1)  (2)  (3) 
logta  -0.00130 -0.00461 -0.00398 
  [-1.437] [-0.980] [-0.846] 
interest  0.181*** 0.0965***  0.0970*** 
  [10.31] [2.649]  [2.666] 
gdp  0.590*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 
  [6.711] [3.054] [3.053] 
inf  0.135*** 0.0596  0.0605 
  [3.996] [1.305] [1.327] 
loggdppc  -0.00320*** 0.0733***  0.0721*** 
  [-3.531] [2.661] [2.620] 
agreginfo  -0.0229*** -0.0359*** -0.0360*** 
  [-6.609] [-4.001] [-4.019] 
cr  0.00923*** 0.0121***  0.0121*** 
  [5.190] [2.836] [2.832] 
Constant  0.120*** -0.734**  -0.728** 
 [6.492]  [-2.299]  [-2.284] 
        
Observations 3,983  3,983  3,980 
R-squared   0.015  0.015 
Adjusted R-squared 0.100     
Number of Banks    645  644 
Bank FE    YES  YES 
Country FE      YES 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's Total Assets; interest is the percent 
interest rate, banks prime lending; GDP is the gross domestic product measured in annual percent 
changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of inflation; loggdppc is the logarithm of 
gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is the Information Sharing Score (Public 
Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no information sharing), 1 (the country has a Pub-
lic Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest information sharing: the country has a Public Registry 
and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights aggregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor 
rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
then by interest margin, as the  dependent variable in the  regressions, we try to 
identify the  channel through which profitability is affected by creditor rights and 
information sharing. Table 8 shows the  results for the  same previously run three 
types of regressions. While we cannot observe any effect of information sharing or 
creditor-rights protection on loan loss provision (columns 1, 2, and 3), there is a clear 
effect on the intermediation spread (columns 4, 5, and 6), confirming competition as 
a cause of changes in profitability. Creditor-rights protection is a significant variable 
whatever the type of regression, though only pooled OLS analysis shows a signifi-
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Table 8  Effects of Information Sharing and Creditor Rights on Loan Loss Provision 





































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
logta  -0.000745*** -0.00561*** -0.00563*** -0.00407*** -0.00616*** -0.00615*** 
  [-3.129] [-3.487] [-3.491]  [-17.51] [-7.230]  [-7.201] 
interest  0.0391*** 0.0952*** 0.0952*** 0.112*** 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 
  [8.938] [8.154] [8.150]  [25.69]  [5.485] [5.485] 
gdp  0.0209 0.0157 0.0157  -0.170*** -0.0551*** -0.0551*** 
  [0.946] [0.579] [0.578]  [-7.793] [-3.693] [-3.692] 
inf  0.000261 -0.0109* -0.0109* -0.0114** 0.0198*** 0.0198*** 
  [0.0536] [-1.696]  [-1.696]  [-2.347] [5.510] [5.509] 
loggdppc  0.000937*** 0.00582 0.00584 -0.000626*** 0.0224*** 0.0224*** 
  [4.009] [0.648] [0.650]  [-2.720] [4.601] [4.594] 
agreginfo  0.00113 0.00289 0.00290  0.00292*** 0.000921 0.000918 
  [1.267] [0.991] [0.992] [3.361] [0.570] [0.567] 
cr  0.000466 -0.00124 -0.00124 0.00201*** 0.00179** 0.00179** 
  [1.012] [-0.867] [-0.866]  [4.398] [2.240] [2.238] 
Constant  0.00140 0.00731 0.00727 0.0868*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 
 [0.288]  [0.0704]  [0.0701]  [18.38] [-2.789]  [-2.787] 
          
Observations 3,912  3,912 3,909 4,135 4,135 4,132 
R-squared   0.030  0.030   0.045  0.045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032     0.282    
Number of Banks    634  633    644  643 
Bank  FE   YES YES   YES YES 
Country  FE     YES    YES 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
logta is the logarithm of the Bank's Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime 
lending; gdp is the gross domestic product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices);  
inf is the annual percent change of inflation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per 
capita (constant prices); agreginfo is the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bu-
reau), and it takes three values: 0 (no information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Pri-
vate Bureau) or 2 (strongest information sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private 
Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights aggregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 
(strong creditor rights). 
Concerning the profitability persistence analysis, Table 9 presents regressions 
of next-period ROE on current ROE, creditor rights, information sharing, size, and 
economic control variables. First, we consider the pooled sample in Panel A. Current 
ROE explains a large amount of next-period ROE (high persistence). Some macro-
economic variables remain important. More specifically, the  existence of current 
high interest increases future profitability and, as the  country becomes richer (in 
terms of GDP per capita), future ROEs decline. This may reflect a more competitive 
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Table 9  Cross-Sectional Estimates: Next Year ROE 
Panel A: Regressions by Creditor Rights Index  
 pooled  sample cr = 0  cr = 1  cr = 2  cr = 3  cr = 4 
  FROE FROE FROE FROE FROE FROE 
ROE  0.563 0.63  0.351 0.563 0.45  0.656 
   (23.44)** (8.55)** (6.24)**  (14.38)** (9.35)** (7.50)** 
logta  -0.001 -0.005  0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
   (1.37) (2.41)*  (1.69) (0.94) (2.22)*  (0.76) 
interest  0.047 -0.176  0.042 -0.074 0.219 0.031 
   (2.43)* (2.83)**  (1.33)  (2.18)* (3.99)**  (0.25) 
gdp  0.069 0.137  -0.184  -0.115 0.238  -0.453 
   (0.95) (0.38) (1.29) (0.7)  (2.00)*  (2.71)** 
inf  0.041 -0.446  0.329  0.045 -0.139  0.031 
   (1.3)  (1.42) (4.87)**  (0.77) (2.47)*  (0.31) 
loggdppc  -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.007  0.005 
   (3.03)**  (1.39) (4.42)**  (0.43) (3.47)**  (1.33) 
agreginfo  -0.01 0.006  -0.003  -0.017 -0.013 -0.013 
   (3.36)** (0.61)  (0.25)  (3.79)** (2.24)*  (0.84) 
cr  0.002       
   (1.31)       
Constant  0.088 0.209 0.1  0.121 0.066  -0.032 
    (5.46)** (3.51)** (2.90)** (3.59)** (2.75)** (0.34) 
Observations  3356 212  875 1078 916  275 
R-squared  0.39 0.52 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.50 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of in-
flation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest infor-
mation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights ag-
gregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
environment in developing countries, which erodes monopolistic rents. Furthermore, 
the existence of credit bureaus lowers future ROEs, although the creditor-rights index 
is not statistically significant. 
To explore the impact of creditor-rights protection more deeply, we run cross- 
-sectional regressions by each level of the creditor-rights index. In countries with little 
protection, high interest rates are associated with a decline in next-period profitabili-
ty. By contrast, in countries with more creditor protection, interest rates make a positive 
contribution to profitability. This is consistent with the idea that low protection may 
increase the losses from default events and the volatility of lenders’ earnings. 
As for the profitability persistence, it is not clear how it changes in different 
contexts. For this reason, we make additional cross-sectional time series regressions, 
not reported here, and we find that the highest persistence of ROE corresponds to 
banks in countries with the  strongest creditor-rights protection. This is consistent 
with the cross-sectional regressions reported in Table 9, Panel A: the coefficient of 
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Table 9  Cross-Sectional Estimates: Next Year ROE 
Panel B: Regressions by Information Sharing Score 
   pooled  agreginfo = 0  agreginfo = 1  agreginfo = 2 
   FROE FROE FROE FROE 
ROE  0.563 0.496 0.554 0.477 
   (23.44)** (6.99)**  (18.91)** (7.89)** 
logta  -0.001 0.004  -0.001 0.002 
   (1.37) (1.93) (1.17) (1.3) 
interest  0.047 0.08  0.096  -0.066 
   (2.43)* (1.24)  (2.82)**  (1.93) 
gdp  0.069 0.029  -0.017 0.081 
   (0.95) (0.19) (0.18) (0.42) 
inf  0.041 0.083  -0.035 0.128 
   (1.3) (2.37)*  (0.7) (0.74) 
loggdppc  -0.002 0.01  -0.005  -0.007 
   (3.03)** (4.22)** (4.79)** (3.18)** 
agreginfo  -0.01  0 0 0 
   (3.36)**  (.) (.) (.) 
cr  0.002 0.012 0.004  -0.024 
   (1.31) (2.74)**  (1.96) (4.47)** 
Constant  0.088  -0.162 0.106 0.153 
    (5.46)** (3.64)** (5.43)** (3.81)** 
Observations  3356 557 2246 553 
R-squared  0.39 0.41 0.41 0.27 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of in-
flation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest infor-
mation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights ag-
gregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
In Table 9, Panel B we analyze in detail the influence of information sharing. 
Persistence of ROE increases from economies without credit bureaus to countries 
with a private or public one; however, when both types exist, ROE is less persistent. 
This may reflect the fact that banks obtain big information benefits in environments 
of strong informational asymmetries, but improvements in the availability of infor-
mation add more competitive pressure and lower the informational rents of establish-
ed banks when those asymmetries are relaxed. 
Furthermore, in countries without credit bureaus, better creditor rights tend to 
increase future bank profitability. This is consistent with banks operating amid strong 
informational asymmetries but facing a  safer market. Panel B also indicates that 
higher gross domestic product gives an impulse to next-period return on equity in coun-
tries with information restrictions. However, in the presence of credit bureaus, richer 
countries tend to exhibit less commercial bank profitability. This supports the idea that 
in richer countries, information tends to increase the competitive pressure, whereas in 
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Table 10  Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Next year ROE 
Panel A: Change in Creditor Rights Index from 1996–1999 to 2000–2003 
   Change 
Variables 
No Change  Change 
Increase Decrease 
ROE  0.198*** -0.150*** -0.175  -0.101** 
  [0.0192] [0.0451] [0.277]  [0.0477] 
Logta  -0.0226*** -0.0473** 0.0768  -0.0530** 
  [0.00480] [0.0238]  [0.144]  [0.0253] 
Interest  -0.0171 -0.604** 1.029  -0.424 
  [0.0358]  [0.252] [3.029] [0.283] 
gdp  0.00607 -1.554*** -2.894  -1.602*** 
  [0.0769]  [0.387] [2.799] [0.396] 
Inf  -0.0631  0.120 2.193 0.284 
  [0.0452]  [0.405] [3.617] [0.512] 
loggdppc  0.0856**  0.243 1.421 0.352 
  [0.0299]  [0.275] [6.638] [0.339] 
agreginfo  -0.0151* 0.0475    0.0563 
  [0.00864] [0.0666]    [0.0661] 
cr  -0.0493 0.00138  0.518  -0.000172 
  [0.0409] [0.00548]  [0.333]  [0.00544] 
Constant  -0.456 -2.773  -21.82  -4.299 
 [0.331]  [4.124]  [93.14]  [5.062] 
Observations 2,813  541  19  522 
R-squared 0.060  0.122 0.686 0.104 
Banks  513  124 4 120 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of 
inflation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest in-
formation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights 
aggregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
poorer countries, banks’ earnings are affected by increases in wealth more than by in-
creases in competition. 
Given that creditor protection may not have an immediate effect on bank prof-
itability, we divided the whole period into two sub-periods: 1996–1999 and 2000– 
–2003, in order to check if those countries with creditor-rights changes from the first 
to the second sub-period show a remarkable change in profitability persistence. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the effect of both positive and negative changes in creditor 
protection. Using fixed-effects panel data to get Table 10, our results in Panel  A 
show lower persistence when the creditor protection level is different. We emphasize 
the negative coefficient of information sharing when creditor protection stays un-
changed. In Panel B, the same type of regression has been run to analyze differences 
in profitability persistence in the presence of information-sharing changes. Though 
only positive changes are present in the sample, our panel data analysis confirms 
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Table 10  Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Next year ROE 
Panel B: Change in Information Sharing Score from 1996–1999 to 2000–2003 
   Change 
Variables 
No Change  Change 
Increase Decrease 
ROE  0.113*** 0.135**  0.135**   
  [0.0196] [0.0459] [0.0459]   
logta  -0.0222*** -0.0420*** -0.0420***   
  [0.00538] [0.0119]  [0.0119]   
interest  -0.0689* 0.136  0.136   
  [0.0399] [0.103]  [0.103]   
gdp  -0.103 -0.156 -0.156   
  [0.0870] [0.231]  [0.231]   
inf  -0.0827 0.0187 0.0187   
  [0.0526] [0.106]  [0.106]   
loggdppc  0.0810** 0.234**  0.234**   
  [0.0326] [0.104]  [0.104]   
agreginfo   -0.00938  -0.00938   
   [0.0121]  [0.0121]   
cr  0.00547 -0.178**  -0.178**   
  [0.00394] [0.0604]  [0.0604]   
Constant  -0.564 -1.772 -1.772   
 [0.368]  [1.275]  [1.275]   
Observations 2,847  507  507  no  obs. 
R-squared 0.023  0.102  0.102   
Banks 533  104  104   
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
FROE is next year Return on Equity; ROE is the Return on Equity; logta is the logarithm of the Bank's 
Total Assets; interest is the percent interest rate, banks prime lending; gdp is the gross domestic 
product measured in annual percent changes (constant prices); inf is the annual percent change of 
inflation; loggdppc is the logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant prices); agreginfo is 
the Information Sharing Score (Public Registry or Private Bureau), and it takes three values: 0 (no 
information sharing), 1 (the country has a Public Registry or a Private Bureau) or 2 (strongest in-
formation sharing: the country has a Public Registry and a Private Bureau); cr is the Creditor rights 
aggregate score. It varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
more profitability persistence when the information-sharing level is higher. In this 
panel, we emphasize the negative coefficient of the creditor protection variable when 
information sharing increases. It suggests a certain substitution effect, as previous 
literature points out, which we put down to a higher level of competitiveness.  
Taken together, the evidence found suggests a causal relationship between 
creditor-rights protection (the legal system) and informational asymmetries with re-
gard to current and future commercial bank profitability. In general, our results show 
that economic shocks and other conditions may change the degree of competition in 
the market. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 4                                      353 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents evidence on the effects of creditor-rights protection and 
information sharing on the level and persistence of commercial banks’ profitability, 
using firm-level data for more than a hundred countries during the period 1996–2003. 
Concerning the level of profitability, our estimates show that, as hypothesized, 
the most profitable banks come from countries without credit bureaus and with strong 
creditor-rights protection. These results are consistent with the idea that countries 
with better investor protection (richer common law countries) develop bigger capital 
and credit markets, but it is necessary to control for informational asymmetries be-
cause of the interconnection of the two factors as regards their effect on bank per-
formance. Our results support previous evidence found by Brown et al. (2009) and 
Houston et al. (2010). A complementary analysis (Table 8) suggests that part of this 
variation comes from the effect of creditor protection and information sharing on 
the interest spread (confirming competition as a cause of changes in profitability).  
It is also worth noting that lower levels of information sharing are associated with 
higher future profitability, supporting the idea that in countries without credit bureaus 
the  informational advantage confers to banks some market power over their cus-
tomers, while information-sharing agreements tend to increase the intensity of com-
petition. 
Concerning the influence of the economic control variables, banks operating 
in countries with high interest rates tend to show high levels of profitability. How-
ever, as the country becomes richer, future ROEs decline, possibly because of in-
creasing competition. Also, these differences might reflect a significant variation in 
domestic government financial needs. In other words, banks may employ govern-
ment securities as a source of large steady profits. In addition, large deficit financing 
through the issuance of treasury bills crowds out the private sector by capturing banks’ 
investments and may also put pressure on interest rates, making access to bank lend- 
ing even more difficult for the private sector. 
As for our results for persistence of profitability, in general, banks from coun-
tries with the  strongest creditor-rights protection and without information sharing 
seem to have more persistence in profitability. In Table 9, the size of the coefficient 
for current ROE varies widely across the groups made for creditor protection (Pan- 
el A). Panel B shows that profitability persistence tends to increase from countries 
without credit bureaus to countries that have established one. By contrast, persistence 
of profitability diminishes from countries with one credit bureau to countries with 
more than one credit bureau. In other words, our results suggest that when a credit 
bureau is established, credit markets become bigger and more active, improving 
the persistence of banks’ earnings. But after some time (and with a certain degree of 
information), other financial firms enter the market and reduce the banks’ appropri-
ation of informational rents and the gains of a bigger market. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that variation in both the persistence and 
the levels of profitability could arise from sources other than competition. Although 
macroeconomic shocks were controlled for in this study, there could be estimation 
biases arising from the inclusion of only commercial banks, the use of accounting 
rates of return, or the short length of the time series data. 
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